Rebel commitment to peace processes: a historical institutionalist analysis

Abstract

Rebel groups exhibit significant variation in their commitment to peace processes: some withdraw at the informal stage, others exit at the formal stage, some retreat after signing a peace agreement, and others implement the agreement. Existing scholarship often overlooks this variation, treating rebel commitment to peace processes as either present or absent. To address this gap, I conceptualize peace processes as sequential progression across four stages established in the literature. In turn, I define rebel commitment to peace processes as a long-term phenomenon shaped by a series of interdependent decisions, the cumulative impact of which determines a group’s commitment at any given stage. I argue that the patterns of these interdependent decisions are best understood through a systematic analysis of the rebel organization using the framework of Historical Institutionalism (HI). Applying this framework, the unit of analysis is rebel institutions, which I characterize along two primary dimensions: the centralization of power and internal cohesion. The HI framework explains how rebel institutions, formed by distinct combinations of these dimensions, shape group’s preferences regarding peace processes. HI’s temporal concepts—path dependency, critical junctures, and timing and sequencing—explain how these preferences evolve, showing how prior choices constrain subsequent decisions and make institutional change prohibitively costly. I empirically trace distinct institutional pathways across four case studies to demonstrate how the costs of institutional change lead rebel groups to withdraw at various stages of peace processes. The article offers two main contributions: it highlights the underexplored importance of rebel organizations in shaping decisions related to peace process, and it extends the application of HI to the often less formalized institutions of non-state actors.