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An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints

Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2024https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006article
AJG 1
Weight
0.30

What the paper says

An auctioneer wishes to sell multiple heterogeneous indivisible items to several bidders. Every bidder can demand several items, have complex preferences and faces a hard budget constraint. In this setting, Walrasian equilibria may fail to exist. We propose an ascending menu auction that always yields an efficient allocation of items, which is not only in the core but also strongly Pareto efficient. Furthermore, the auction finds a strong core allocation with a fully efficient assignment of items when bidders are not budget constrained.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{zaifu2024,
  title        = {{An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints}},
  author       = {Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2024},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006},
}

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An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints

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Evidence weight

0.30

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.