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Ambitious Emissions Goal as a Strategic Preemption

Hiroaki Yamagami et al.

Strategic Behavior and the Environment2021https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000103preprint
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

We model a political game in which a policymaker pledges a domestic emissions goal to choose an instrument between carbon pricing and a quota approach. We show that, although the policymaker is presented with an emissions goal proposed from an international environmental agreement, she/he may pledge a more stringent goal than the proposed level. We define this stringent goal as an “ambitious emissions goal.” We show that such a goal preempts the industry’s lobby in the choice of an instrument. Finally, our model extensions show that the policymaker conditionally pledges the ambitious emissions goal, depending on how the emissions trading scheme is designed and how an instrument is chosen.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000103

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@article{hiroaki2021,
  title        = {{Ambitious Emissions Goal as a Strategic Preemption}},
  author       = {Hiroaki Yamagami et al.},
  journal      = {Strategic Behavior and the Environment},
  year         = {2021},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000103},
}

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Ambitious Emissions Goal as a Strategic Preemption

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.