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Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements

Gustavo de Souza & André Victor D. Luduvice

International Economic Review2026https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70061article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

In the United States, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that both requirements reduce unemployment and that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part‐time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. We develop a heterogeneous agents model with history‐dependent UI benefits to explain these results and quantify an optimal utilitarian UI design. The optimal policy has a high monetary and a short tenure requirement.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70061

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@article{gustavo2026,
  title        = {{Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements}},
  author       = {Gustavo de Souza & André Victor D. Luduvice},
  journal      = {International Economic Review},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70061},
}

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Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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