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Governance, Productivity and Economic Development

Cuong Le Van et al.

Journal of Public Economic Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70099article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R&D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal revenues, and undertakes public investment (in R&D, infrastructure, etc.). Corruption is modeled as a fraction of tax revenues that is siphoned off and removed from the economy. We first establish the existence of a political‐economic equilibrium. Then, using an analytically tractable framework with two private agents, we examine the effects of corruption and evaluate the impact of various policies, including redistribution and innovation‐led strategies.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70099

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@article{cuong2026,
  title        = {{Governance, Productivity and Economic Development}},
  author       = {Cuong Le Van et al.},
  journal      = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70099},
}

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Governance, Productivity and Economic Development

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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