Mandatory Information Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Cash Holdings: Evidence From a Quasi‐Natural Experiment
Xi Zhang et al.
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of mandatory information disclosure regulation on corporate cash holding decisions, a fundamental component of working capital management. Using industry‐specific information disclosure guidelines as a quasi‐natural experiment that introduces shocks to disclosure practices across different sectors, we find that the implementation of these regulations leads to a significant reduction in corporate cash holdings. We identify two mechanisms underlying this effect. Specifically, the implementation of the information disclosure regulation lowers agency costs and reduces the operational risks faced by firms, leading to lower cash holdings. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the negative relation between information disclosure regulation and corporate cash holdings is stronger among firms facing greater financial constraints, those with more effective internal controls, firms in highly competitive industries, and those operating in high‐tech sectors. The reduction in corporate cash holdings driven by information disclosure regulation enhances firms' sustainable development capacity and alleviates underinvestment problems, supporting more efficient resource allocation and effective working capital management.
4 citations
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.37 × 0.4 = 0.15 |
| M · momentum | 0.60 × 0.15 = 0.09 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.