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Nonemptiness of the Alpha‐Core

V. Filipe Martins‐da‐Rocha & Nicholas C. Yannelis

Journal of Public Economic Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70097preprint
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We prove nonemptiness of the ‐core for balanced games with nonordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991b), and Kajii (1992). In particular, we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the nonemptiness results to models with infinite‐dimensional strategy spaces. We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied, while our nonemptiness result applies.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70097

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@article{v.2026,
  title        = {{Nonemptiness of the Alpha‐Core}},
  author       = {V. Filipe Martins‐da‐Rocha & Nicholas C. Yannelis},
  journal      = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70097},
}

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Nonemptiness of the Alpha‐Core

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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