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How Android Auto Reshapes the Law of Refusal to Deal (and What It Means in Practice)

Pablo IbáñEz Colomo

World Competition Law and Economics Review2026https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2026001article
ABDC C
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

The judgment of the Court of Justice (ECJ) in Android Auto has reshaped the law of refusal to deal. In particular, it has significantly reduced the scope of application of the Magill and Bronner doctrines, which are, in the aftermath of the ruling, only relevant where a dominant undertaking operates a fully closed system. This article identifies the ways in which Android Auto has transformed the case law and expands the reach of intervention under Article 102 TFEU. It also identifies the distributional and institutional consequences of the substantive choices made by the ECJ at a time when private enforcement is on the rise across the EU.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2026001

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{pablo2026,
  title        = {{How Android Auto Reshapes the Law of Refusal to Deal (and What It Means in Practice)}},
  author       = {Pablo IbáñEz Colomo},
  journal      = {World Competition Law and Economics Review},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2026001},
}

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How Android Auto Reshapes the Law of Refusal to Deal (and What It Means in Practice)

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.