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Analyst Rational Inattention: Evidence from CEO Turnover Events

R. Thomas Godwin et al.

The Accounting Review2026https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0684article
FT50UTD24AJG 4*ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We consider the dynamics of analyst inattention by investigating how analysts allocate their attention when a firm in their portfolio experiences CEO turnover. Our analysis shows that analysts tend to divert their attention toward firms that experience such events, resulting in less attention and a corresponding reduction in forecasting accuracy for nonevent firms. Furthermore, this reduction in accuracy varies with factors related to the costs and benefits of rationally allocating attention to firms that have experienced CEO turnover. Collectively, our analysis responds to the call for research on rational inattention among analysts and illustrates the specific intraportfolio events that alter attention allocation and information. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14; M12; M40; M41.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0684

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@article{r.2026,
  title        = {{Analyst Rational Inattention: Evidence from CEO Turnover Events}},
  author       = {R. Thomas Godwin et al.},
  journal      = {The Accounting Review},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0684},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.