What could justify a prohibition on the luxury emissions of the very rich?

What the paper says

In this article, I discuss whether, in addition to pricing emissions, we should prohibit a specific category of luxury emissions, those arising from goods and services that only the richest can afford. In the first part, I ask whether a justification for such a prohibition can be derived from emissions sufficientarianism. I argue that emissions sufficientarianism does not explain why we should prohibit only high-wealth emissions and not also the recursive production of emissions that are neither high-wealth nor subsistence. Moreover, it does not provide a reason why we should prevent the production of high-wealth emissions by those who have offset them ex ante. In the second part, I ask whether a justification for the prohibition of high-wealth emissions can be based on emissions limitarianism. I argue that emissions limitarianism can explain why we should prohibit only high-wealth emissions, but it cannot account for why high-wealth emissions are bad even if they are offset ex ante. In the third part, I use two arguments, positional consumption and moral disengagement, to explain why carbon offsetting cannot be used as a means of circumventing the emissions ceiling. I conclude with a brief overview of the policy implications of this normative discussion.