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Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe

Julien Hanoteau

Recherches Economiques de Louvain2014https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800002037article
ABDC B
Weight
0.34

What the paper says

Summary Using cross-sector and cross-country data, this paper evidences that rent seeking influenced the allocation of CO 2 emission permits in the two first phases of the European emissions trading scheme. Industry lobbies effectively used the 'job loss' and 'competitiveness' arguments, as unemployment proxy variables significantly impacted the allocation in both phases, and carbon intensity influenced it in the second phase. The countries that adopted a partial auction scheme also gave relatively more permits and in particular to the politically more powerful sectors. This suggests a compensation mechanism and supports the assumption of a political tradeoff between the quantity of permits issued and the decision between free grant and auction. It also confirms that the initial allocation is not neutral in the presence of special interest lobbying.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800002037

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@article{julien2014,
  title        = {{Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe}},
  author       = {Julien Hanoteau},
  journal      = {Recherches Economiques de Louvain},
  year         = {2014},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800002037},
}

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Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe

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Evidence weight

0.34

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.77 × 0.15 = 0.12
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.