Default energy sharing rule: The case of France

Abstract

This policy perspective critically examines the French regulatory framework that governs collective self-consumption of electricity. Under the French Energy Code, energy sharing is subject to a dynamic pro rata to consumption rule by default. We demonstrate how behavioral biases and governance structures lead members to stick to this default. Furthermore, our analysis highlights several shortcomings within this regulatory framework. First, it can create inequitable distributions when members have different consumption profiles or flexibility. Second, it may generate price signals with counterproductive effects, even if the community setting brings some new scrutiny to individual actions. Finally, this centralized approach fundamentally contradicts the decentralized ethos that underpins these initiatives. By highlighting these limitations, we aim to improve the current regulations to boost the development of collective self-consumption and better inform their members before deciding which energy sharing rule to pick. • French law establishes dynamic pro rata to consumption as the default sharing rule. • Behavioral biases and REC governance lead members to adhere to the default rule. • Default pro rata allocation can be inequitable for unequal loads or flexibility. • Pro rata pricing signals may encourage load shifting or increased usage (rebound effects). • Top-down default conflicts with commons governance; clearer guidance is necessary.