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Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing

Zhan Wang et al.

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2023https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.001article
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland & Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A strictly envy-free (SEF) allocation is shown to be the unique IS and Pareto-optimal allocation, the outcome of the unique strong Nash equilibrium of a congestion game, and the unique Pseudo market equilibrium allocation in HZ. The algorithm always obtains the unique SEF allocation (if any) and fixes a designed flaw of existing lotteries.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.001

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{zhan2023,
  title        = {{Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing}},
  author       = {Zhan Wang et al.},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2023},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.001},
}

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Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.