The Effect of Divorce and Marriage Contracts on Tax Non-Compliance
Hoang Ha Nguyen Thi
What the paper says
This paper studies whether the landmark ruling Radmacher v Granatino 2010 changed tax non-compliance by married self-employed individuals in the UK through an increase in the enforceability of marriage contracts. I argue that the probability of divorce and the probability of marriage contracts being enforceable influence married self-employed individuals tax non-compliance behaviour as they try to hide income from their spouses. Using a theoretical model, I show that a higher probability of marriage contract enforceability leads to less income being hidden, while a higher probability of divorce results in more concealment. Additionally, the model predicts that higher tax rates increase the incentive to underreport income. A difference-in-differences analysis comparing married self-employed and married employed households in the UK suggests that the Radmacher v Granatino ruling however did not seem to significantly reduce income misreporting among married self-employed households.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.