The political economy of policy instruments: The Left and collectively governed markets in Germany
Niccolò Durazzi & Cecilia Ivardi
What the paper says
Recent government interventions support the objectives of collective markets through public policy rather than relying on traditional strategic cooperation between non-state actors. We ask when and how left-wing governments intervene in collectively-governed markets. We develop a novel theoretical framework at the intersection of public policy and comparative political economy. We build on public policy scholarship to mobilize a typology of policy instruments available to governments to shore up collective markets, including regulation ( sticks ), subsidies ( carrots ), and information ( sermons ). We embed this hierarchical classification in a political economy framework to outline under which conditions we expect policymakers to opt for different instruments. We illustrate the usefulness of this approach through a case study of least likely policy areas – labor market and training policy – nested within a least likely case – Germany.
1 citation
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06 |
| M · momentum | 0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.