Administrative monopoly regulation and employee wages: Evidence from Fair competition review system in China
Pengcheng Jiang & Yujia Niu
What the paper says
Unlike previous studies examining how monopoly regulation policies affect enterprise behavior, this study uses the implementation of China's Fair Competition Review System as a quasi-natural experiment. This study uses data from non-financial listed enterprises and employs a difference-in-differences model to explore the impact and mechanism of administrative monopoly regulation on employee wages. The results show that administrative monopoly regulation can reduce average employee wages in administrative monopoly enterprises. This negative effect is more pronounced in firms with lower financing constraints and higher operating profits and in provinces with stronger government intervention. The economic mechanism test results indicate that reducing economic rent, curbing the labor scale, and increasing financing constraints are important mechanisms through which administrative monopoly regulation curbs excessively high compensation in these enterprises. Finally, this study finds that administrative monopoly regulation helps narrow the internal compensation gap of administrative monopoly enterprises.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.