Promoting Conspiracy Theories Strategically

What the paper says

What motivates politicians to amplify conspiracy theories? What constrains them from doing so? This article introduces a new theoretical framework, the strategic calculus of conspiracy theory promotion. Conspiracy theories, we argue, enable politicians to mobilize supporters but expose proponents to potential backlash. Using original data on conspiracy theory promotion by members of Congress on social media, we consider whether members use conspiracy theories to secure votes and campaign contributions. Difference-in-differences analyses reveal that members are more likely to promote conspiracy theories prior to a contested primary election and less likely to promote them afterwards. Additionally, we find that members raise more money from individual donors following conspiracy theory promotion. Our theory and findings highlight the need for more research focused on how political incentives shape the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation. What motivates politicians to amplify conspiracy theories? What constrains them from doing so? This article introduces a new theoretical framework, the strategic calculus of conspiracy theory promotion. Conspiracy theories, we argue, enable politicians to mobilize supporters but expose proponents to potential backlash. Using original data on conspiracy theory promotion by members of Congress on social media, we consider whether members use conspiracy theories to secure votes and campaign contributions. Difference-in-differences analyses reveal that members are more likely to promote conspiracy theories prior to a contested primary election and less likely to promote them afterwards. Additionally, we find that members raise more money from individual donors following conspiracy theory promotion. Our theory and findings highlight the need for more research focused on how political incentives shape the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation.