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The Voting Premium

Doron Levit et al.

The Journal of Finance2026https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70037article
FT50UTD24AJG 4*ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders. Our theory reconciles conflicting empirical findings by showing that standard measures of the voting premium often misrepresent the true value of voting rights, increased conflicts between the blockholder and small shareholders do not necessarily raise the voting premium, and the voting premium can even turn negative when small shareholders free‐ride on the blockholder's trades.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70037

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{doron2026,
  title        = {{The Voting Premium}},
  author       = {Doron Levit et al.},
  journal      = {The Journal of Finance},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70037},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.