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Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations

Joshua S. Gans

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2025https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2025.12.002article
AJG 1
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

This paper examines whether Catch-22 situations persist as equilibrium phenomena based on Gatekeepers' preferences rather than arbitrary rules. We model a game-theoretic scenario inspired by Heller's paradox, featuring a Requester (either Sane or Insane) who signals before a Gatekeeper decides to grant or deny their request. Our analysis identifies conditions where Catch-22 situations emerge as equilibria and evaluates their efficiency properties. Results demonstrate that such situations can arise naturally as efficient responses by Gatekeepers facing asymmetric information. The model is extended to labor markets, where "experience required for jobs, but jobs required for experience" creates similar dynamics.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2025.12.002

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@article{joshua2025,
  title        = {{Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations}},
  author       = {Joshua S. Gans},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2025.12.002},
}

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Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.