European tacit collusion theory and its application to pricealgorithms
Jan Kupčík
Abstract
The article’s aim is analysing the European case law and identifying the crucial elements of the concepts of agreements, concerted practices and a collective dominance that differentiate them from a tacit collusion concept. On these cornerstones, the theory of tacit collusion may be construed. Furthermore, the article illustrates how the theory is applied to the already dealt examples of algorithmic collusion and how to assess various kinds of possible algorithmic collusions in the future. Finally, based on the previous findings, it briefly elaborates on the possible outcomes of already suggested amendments of the legislation targeting price algorithms.
1 citation
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.09 × 0.4 = 0.04 |
| M · momentum | 0.80 × 0.15 = 0.12 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.