When Power Corrupts
Joseph Phiri
What the paper says
The purpose of this study was to investigate how power is abused through individual and collective mechanisms of state capture in Zambia. The study drew on the three-pronged theory to understand diverse mechanisms of state capture. Data collection relied on archival evidence and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from institutions of accountability. Thematic analysis was used whereby data accounts that corresponded to each of the pillars in the theoretical framework were identified and designated to each theme. Findings highlight the prominence of legislative, policy, judicial, and political mechanisms that are utilised by influential actors to capture institutions of accountability. This study presents critical implications reiterating the challenging nature of accountability in the midst of captured government institutions. The study contributes to the literature by demonstrating both the discreet and the not so discreet mechanisms through which elites capture state institutions to achieve goals of a personal and corrupt nature.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.