Domestic Veto Players and Negotiation Dynamics: Canadian Internal Politics and International Agreements
Fen Osler Hampson
What the paper says
Abstract This article explores the role of crucial domestic veto players in Canada’s internal negotiations and their respective influence on Canada’s international negotiating behavior. It argues that the veto power of these actors is both endogenously and exogenously determined but also contextual and dependent on the issues that are the subject of any given negotiation as well as the parties involved. The constellation of partisan veto players is also defined by the level of electoral support the governing party has in the House of Commons, the degree to which it is forced to rely on the support of other parties to stay in power, and the interests of the provinces and the federal bureaucracy in developing policy on any given issue(s). Hence, a dynamic, variable element exists in the power and influence that specific domestic veto players exercise at any given time.
1 citation
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06 |
| M · momentum | 0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.