The governance trap of strategic autonomy: evaluating policy overreach in semiconductor industrial strategies

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to examine how strategic autonomy in semiconductor policy can lead to governance overreach. It argues that excessive state intervention – justified by security and resilience narratives – may reduce flexibility and innovation. To address this, the study develops a Policy Overreach Governance Framework (POGF) to analyze how autonomy discourses reshape institutional dynamics and create self-reinforcing governance traps in global semiconductor governance. Design/methodology/approach Using a qualitative comparative approach, this paper integrates securitization theory, policy feedback and adaptive governance. The POGF identifies four dimensions – institutional expansion, narrative entrenchment, coordination erosion and feedback deficit – and is applied to five jurisdictions: the USA, European Union, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Analysis is based on policy documents, reports and scholarly literature. Findings Across all cases, security-oriented industrial policies expand state intervention and entrench policy narratives. These dynamics weaken coordination and reduce feedback, creating governance traps that limit innovation and collaboration. While intended to enhance resilience, strategic autonomy often becomes ideological and counterproductive. The study highlights the need for evaluation, coordination and balanced narratives to maintain adaptability. Originality/value This paper introduces the POGF to examine the institutional risks of strategic autonomy. By linking securitization, feedback and adaptive governance theories, it shifts focus from competitiveness to governance flexibility. The framework provides an early-warning tool for policymakers to detect overreach and recalibrate semiconductor strategies before resilience efforts become rigid or self-defeating.