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Mediated (anti)persuasive communication

ISO New England, USA et al.

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2025https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2025.12.001article
AJG 1
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

Can private information or mediation change a sender's behavior and improve the receiver's expected utility in persuasive communication games? In a mediated Bayesian persuasion model, private information cannot improve the receiver's expected utility when the sender communicates it. When the intermediary communicates the private information, the receiver's expected utility improves only under sufficient accuracy of the intermediary's private information, as captured by a positive autarky value of the intermediary's private information (AVIPI). Finally, different classes of equilibria are analyzed to show that the sender's strategic behavior is generally affected by the intermediary's presence as he tries to persuade the intermediary to, in turn, persuade the receiver.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2025.12.001

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@article{iso2025,
  title        = {{Mediated (anti)persuasive communication}},
  author       = {ISO New England, USA et al.},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2025.12.001},
}

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Mediated (anti)persuasive communication

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.