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Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality

Amit Gayer

Games2026https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020019article
AJG 1ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

This paper analyzes a monopolistic market with a continuum of consumers in the linear case. Consumers are vertically differentiated by a one-dimensional preference for quality, and the monopolist is allowed to offer a menu of quality-price pairs. The analysis shows that, in the linear case, the monopolist’s optimal offer endogenously collapses to a single quality-price pair, where the quality equals the highest feasible level. In addition, welfare maximization is achieved if and only if the market is fully served in equilibrium.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020019

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@article{amit2026,
  title        = {{Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality}},
  author       = {Amit Gayer},
  journal      = {Games},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020019},
}

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Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.