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Voluntary Partnerships for Equally Sharing Contribution Costs

Irene Maria Buso et al.

The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0043article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, an institutional mechanism designed to enhance cooperation. In this mechanism, contributors have the option to voluntarily contribute to the public good and decide whether to join a (sub)group where partners equally share the contribution cost. Theoretically, stable cost-sharing partnerships enhance efficiency since their partners fully contribute, while outsiders would free-ride. Our data reveal that individual joining and contribution behaviors do not always align with benchmark predictions: partnerships are not always formed, and when they are, they are not always of the optimal size; partners often contribute less than maximally, and outsiders more than minimally. Nonetheless, we document systematic evidence of partnership formation and significantly improved provision of public goods across rounds.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0043

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{irene2025,
  title        = {{Voluntary Partnerships for Equally Sharing Contribution Costs}},
  author       = {Irene Maria Buso et al.},
  journal      = {The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0043},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.