arbiter
JournalsPricingAccount

Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players

Pathikrit Basu

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2023https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004article
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.

Open paper page →

Cite this paper

https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{pathikrit2023,
  title        = {{Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players}},
  author       = {Pathikrit Basu},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2023},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.

Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.