A Shared Interest: Do Bonds Strengthen Equity Monitoring?

Todd A. Gormley & Manish Jha

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis2026https://doi.org/10.1017/s002210902610266xarticle
FT50AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

Institutional investors conduct more governance research and are less likely to follow proxy advisor vote recommendations when a company’s bonds comprise a larger share of their assets. These findings are driven by bond holdings, shareholder proposals, and companies where fixed-income managers are more likely to be attentive and share an interest with equity investors in improving governance. The findings do not concentrate on companies or shareholder proposals where creditor–shareholder conflicts are likely. Overall, the findings suggest that corporate bond holdings influence how actively institutions monitor their equity positions and contribute to institutions’ overall incentive to be engaged stewards.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s002210902610266x

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@article{todd2026,
  title        = {{A Shared Interest: Do Bonds Strengthen Equity Monitoring?}},
  author       = {Todd A. Gormley & Manish Jha},
  journal      = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s002210902610266x},
}

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0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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