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Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice

Stergios Athanasoglou & Somouaoga Bonkoungou

Games and Economic Behavior2026https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, M-winning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compared to their M-winning counterparts. The analysis extends to the full preference domain. Since M-winning coalition rules are closely related to strong and proper simple games, the analysis is relevant to this strand of the game-theoretic literature as well.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002

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@article{stergios2026,
  title        = {{Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice}},
  author       = {Stergios Athanasoglou & Somouaoga Bonkoungou},
  journal      = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002},
}

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Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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