Flight Path to Accountability: A Legal Comparison of Boeing’s Shortcomings, Airbus’s Successes, and International Aviation Safety Regulations
Riley M. Wagstaff
Abstract
Investigations following two separate and deadly crashes of Boeing 737 8 Max aircraft revealed that America’s most trusted manufacturer had failed to notify pilots and airliners alike of a new Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, commonly known as MCAS. What had first seemed like an accident unfortunately had a deeper and traceable history. Through relatively new United States legislation, Boeing was essentially permitted to oversee their own operations and grant airworthiness certifications for their own aircrafts. This practice is wholly unlike the detailed certification process of the European manufacturing giant, AirBus, by the European Aviation Safety Administration (EASA). This comment sheds light on the decades long build-up to these horrific crashes, how this series of events could have been prevented, and the ways in which the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Boeing can follow EASA and AirBus’s lead and return to the gold standard of civil aviation. Analyses of United States Codes, Federal Regulations, and International Safety Agreements leads to the conclusion that the United States and the FAA must apply more scrutiny to manufacturers within the 50 states. Alterations to the agreements and codes mentioned in this comment will aid in the overall safety practice of civil aviation.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.