Authoritarian Information Gathering amid Crisis
Sasha de Vogel et al.
What the paper says
How do crises affect information gathering in authoritarian regimes? This study examines how crises impact appeal systems’ ability to collect information on everyday and crisis-related concerns. We argue that crisis immediacy and government repression shape the number and topic of appeals received. Utilizing a novel dataset of appeals submitted to Russia’s Presidential Administration, we analyze four crises: the 2018 pension reform, the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent partial military mobilization. High-immediacy crises generate more crisis-related appeals, while repression suppresses everyday appeals on routine governance issues. This study contributes to scholarship on informational autocracies by highlighting the vulnerability of information-gathering institutions. Focusing on citizen behavior rather than regime incentives, we offer insights into how individuals utilize appeals systems under crisis conditions, enriching understanding of state-society dynamics and the limitations of consultative institutions in autocratic contexts.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.