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Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case

Robin Mamrak

The Journal of Industrial Economics2026https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70023article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

How does antitrust enforcement affect innovation when patents are the main barrier to entry? I address this question by empirically studying the US antitrust case against Xerox, the former monopolist in the market for plain‐paper copiers. In 1975, Xerox accepted a consent decree whose primary remedy was compulsory licensing of all its copier‐technology patents in the US and abroad. I show that this antitrust intervention promoted innovation by other firms in the copier industry, measured by a disproportionate increase in patenting in technology classes with a higher propensity for containing copier‐related inventions. This effect is driven by Japanese competitors, whose patenting became more novel and diverse as they started developing smaller desktop copiers.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70023

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@article{robin2026,
  title        = {{Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case}},
  author       = {Robin Mamrak},
  journal      = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70023},
}

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Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.