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Approval Voting without Faithfulness

Uuganbaatar Ninjbat

Czech Economic Review2013article
ABDC C
Weight
0.32

What the paper says

In this short paper, we analyze the implications of dropping the axiom of faithfulness in the axiomatization of approval voting, due to P. C. Fishburn. We show that a ballot aggregation function satisfies the remaining axioms (neutrality, consistency and cancellation) if and only if it is either a function that chooses the whole set of alternatives, or an approval voting, or a function that chooses the least approved alternatives.

3 citations

Cite this paper

@article{uuganbaatar2013,
  title        = {{Approval Voting without Faithfulness}},
  author       = {Uuganbaatar Ninjbat},
  journal      = {Czech Economic Review},
  year         = {2013},
}

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Approval Voting without Faithfulness

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Evidence weight

0.32

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.60 × 0.15 = 0.09
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.