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Educational Signaling in Two Different Education Systems

Miguel Ángel Ropero García

The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0076article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.37

What the paper says

We consider a two-period signaling model in which an informed worker has to decide whether she invests in education or participates in the labor market in the first period. When the rate at which the cost of education decreases with the worker’s productivity is sufficiently high (low), the worker’s incentives to invest in education become stronger (weaker) when the worker is more patient, when future prospects in the labor market are better, or when the cost of education decreases. Those results are robust to the worker’s risk preferences and to the specification of the prior distribution function of worker’s productivities.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0076

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@article{miguel2025,
  title        = {{Educational Signaling in Two Different Education Systems}},
  author       = {Miguel Ángel Ropero García},
  journal      = {The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0076},
}

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Educational Signaling in Two Different Education Systems

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.