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Voting and Trading on Public Information

Markus Parlasca & Paul Voß

The Review of Financial Studies2026https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag035article
FT50UTD24AJG 4*ABDC A*
Weight
0.37

What the paper says

Abstract This paper studies how public information, such as proxy advice, affects shareholder voting and, thus, corporate decision-making. We find that while public information improves the voting decisions of uninformed shareholders, it also induces privately informed shareholders to exit rather than to exercise their voice (vote). As a result, public information impairs information aggregation by voting but improves information aggregation by trading. Overall, public information can undermine corporate decision-making. Furthermore, slightly more precise public information can lead to a discontinuous reduction in firm value. Our results give rise to new empirical predictions and have implications for regulation.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag035

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@article{markus2026,
  title        = {{Voting and Trading on Public Information}},
  author       = {Markus Parlasca & Paul Voß},
  journal      = {The Review of Financial Studies},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag035},
}

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Voting and Trading on Public Information

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.