Information Nudges, Subsidies, and Crowding Out of Attention: Field Evidence from Energy Efficiency Investments
Matthias Rodemeier & Andreas Löschel
Abstract
How can information substitute or complement financial incentives such as Pigouvian subsidies? We answer this question in a large-scale field experiment that cross-randomizes energy efficiency subsidies with information about the financial savings of LED lighting. Information has two effects: It shifts and rotates demand curves. The direction of the shift is ambiguous and highly dependent on the information design. Informing consumers that an LED saves 90% in annual energy costs increases LED demand, but showing them that 90% corresponds to an average of €11 raises demand for less efficient technologies. The rotation of the demand curve is unambiguous: Information dramatically reduces both own-price and cross-price elasticities, which makes subsidies less effective. The uniform decrease in price elasticities suggests that consumers pay less attention to subsidies when information is provided. We structurally estimate that welfare-maximizing subsidies can be 200% larger than the Pigouvian benchmark when combined with information.
5 citations
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.41 × 0.4 = 0.16 |
| M · momentum | 0.63 × 0.15 = 0.09 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.