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Strategic Trading and Blockholder Dynamics

Iván Marinovic & Felipe Varas

RAND Journal of Economics2026https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70040article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We study strategic trading by a privately informed blockholder who monitors a company and trades its shares. Private information results in larger block sizes in good states, but by increasing the speed of the blockholder's selling, it can result in lower block sizes in bad states. Despite the heterogeneous impact on expected block size, we show that asymmetric information leads to Pareto improvements: it raises stock prices, benefits small uninformed shareholders, and benefits the block owner, despite the negative impact on liquidity.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70040

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@article{iván2026,
  title        = {{Strategic Trading and Blockholder Dynamics}},
  author       = {Iván Marinovic & Felipe Varas},
  journal      = {RAND Journal of Economics},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70040},
}

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Strategic Trading and Blockholder Dynamics

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.