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Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining

Topi Miettinen & Christoph Vanberg

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics2025https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230208article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient. (JEL C78, D71, D72, F53)

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230208

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@article{topi2025,
  title        = {{Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining}},
  author       = {Topi Miettinen & Christoph Vanberg},
  journal      = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230208},
}

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Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.44 × 0.4 = 0.18
M · momentum0.65 × 0.15 = 0.10
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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