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Democratic Deviations: How Organizations Sustain Decentralization Commitments in the Face of Centralization Pressures

Michael H. Lee & Trevor Young-Hyman

Administrative Science Quarterly2026https://doi.org/10.1177/00018392261421927article
FT50UTD24AJG 4*ABDC A*
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0.50

Abstract

Organizations that have committed to decentralizing authority can face situations in which centralized decision making is useful or necessary. However, centralization risks undermining an organization’s perceived commitment to decentralization, which can threaten employees’ motivation and commitment, as well as organizational legitimacy. Leveraging a comparative case study of four organizations that had explicitly committed to decentralize authority and that subsequently centralized authority during the COVID-19 crisis, we identify a process by which organizations can deviate from decentralization commitments while keeping those commitments in place. This process, which we call “democratic deviation,” involves leaders and workers collectively authorizing centralization and then leaders enacting that authority with openness and transparency. In the three of our four cases that deviated democratically, decentralization commitments were upheld. Conversely, when centralization occurred implicitly through leader fiat and was then enacted opaquely by leaders, a process we label “monocratic deviation,” decentralization commitments were undermined. Through this study, we develop a theory of the structural antecedents and processes of durable commitments to decentralization, prompting re-evaluation of decentralization’s assumed fragility. More broadly, our theory suggests how organizations can uphold shared commitments even when they must deviate from them in the face of situational pressures.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00018392261421927

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@article{michael2026,
  title        = {{Democratic Deviations: How Organizations Sustain Decentralization Commitments in the Face of Centralization Pressures}},
  author       = {Michael H. Lee & Trevor Young-Hyman},
  journal      = {Adm.~Sci.~Q.},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00018392261421927},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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