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Mothballing as a Predatory Strategy

Xavier Lambin

The Review of Network Economics2024https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2024-0040article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.30

What the paper says

Abstract The deregulation of the electricity sector in Europe since the early 1990s led to new challenges. In particular, investors are increasingly exposed to risk and mothballing is an option of increasing interest and regulatory scrutiny. I argue that mothballing can be used to avoid losing the war of attrition of a standard exit game, by decreasing the value of rivals and driving them to quit earlier than if the plant was retired. I describe this phenomenon through the lens of simple game-theoretical settings, and propose a real-options game-theoretic model to describe and quantify the effects of mothballing.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2024-0040

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@article{xavier2024,
  title        = {{Mothballing as a Predatory Strategy}},
  author       = {Xavier Lambin},
  journal      = {The Review of Network Economics},
  year         = {2024},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/rne-2024-0040},
}

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Mothballing as a Predatory Strategy

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Evidence weight

0.30

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.