Allocating emission allowances: towards a sustainable approach
Steven Fries
What the paper says
Abstract: The paper examines a politically sensitive issue in design of emission allowance trading systems – how to allocate initially the allowances. In most systems, whether they cover greenhouse gases (GHG) or other pollutants, initial allowance allocations have been largely free and based on past emissions. An alternative is to allocate allowances by auctioning. Political economy considerations point to greater future use of auctioning. This paper sets out reasons for this conclusion, while arguing for a phased transition towards greater auctioning.
2 citations
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.20 × 0.4 = 0.08 |
| M · momentum | 0.80 × 0.15 = 0.12 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.