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On asymmetric equilibria in rent-seeking contests with strictly increasing returns

Christian Ewerhart

Economic Theory Bulletin2025https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00301-4article
ABDC B
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0.50

Abstract

This paper revisits the n -player rent-seeking contest with homogeneous valuations and increasing returns. Our main result says that, for any $$m\in \{2,\ldots ,n-1\}$$ m ∈ { 2 , … , n - 1 } , there are threshold values $$1 1 R ∗ ( m ) R ∗ ( m ) ≤ 2 for the Tullock parameter R such that a pure strategy equilibrium with m active players exists if and only if $$R\in [R_*(m),\,R^*(m)]$$ R ∈ [ R ∗ ( m ) , R ∗ ( m ) ] . Among other things, this observation leads to a simple characterization of the values of R for which the n -player contest has a unique pure strategy equilibrium.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00301-4

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@article{christian2025,
  title        = {{On asymmetric equilibria in rent-seeking contests with strictly increasing returns}},
  author       = {Christian Ewerhart},
  journal      = {Economic Theory Bulletin},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00301-4},
}

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On asymmetric equilibria in rent-seeking contests with strictly increasing returns

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0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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