THE MONOPOLY BENCHMARK ON TWO-SIDED MARKETS

Christopher Müller et al.

Finnish Economic Papers2014article
ABDC B
Weight
0.35

Abstract

The literature on the effects of market concentration in platform industries or two-sided markets often compares the competitive outcome against a benchmark. This benchmark is either the “joint management” solution in which one decision maker runs all platforms or a “pure” monopoly with just one platform. Literature has not generally discussed which benchmark is the appropriate one, i.e. how many platforms the monopolist will operate. In this paper we show that the optimal number of platforms depends on whether agents multi- or singlehome, whether the network externalities are positive or negative, and in some cases on the properties of the demand functions.

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Cite this paper

@article{christopher2014,
  title        = {{THE MONOPOLY BENCHMARK ON TWO-SIDED MARKETS}},
  author       = {Christopher Müller et al.},
  journal      = {Finnish Economic Papers},
  year         = {2014},
}

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Evidence weight

0.35

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.23 × 0.4 = 0.09
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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