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All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits

Benjamin Kang & James Unwin

Games2026https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010002preprint
AJG 1ABDC B
Weight
0.50

Abstract

In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010002

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@article{benjamin2026,
  title        = {{All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits}},
  author       = {Benjamin Kang & James Unwin},
  journal      = {Games},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010002},
}

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All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.