Real Disinvestments and the Distress Anomaly: Evidence from Stocks, Bonds, and Loans
Shuwen Yang et al.
Abstract
We argue that firms’ ability to disinvest real assets helps rationalize the negativedistress premiums in stocks, bonds, and, as we show, loans and firm assets. Usinga real-options model in which shareholders and debtholders share disinvestmentproceeds, the model suggests that the stock (debt) distress premium becomesmore negative with the proceeds paid out to that class, and that both premiumscan be negative when debtholders receive most of the proceeds. Using hard-assetdisinvestment-ability proxies, the stock (bond or loan) distress premium becomesless (more) negative with those proxies, possibly suggesting that shareholdersbenefit more strongly from non-secured-asset disinvestments.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.