Rethinking conflict inflation: the hybrid Keynesian–NAIRU character of the conflict Phillips curve
Thomas Palley
What the paper says
This paper presents a new formulation of conflict inflation in which the bargaining process is marked by opportunistic behavior by the dominant party. There is also full feedback of inflation expectations in the bargaining process. The model generates Phillips-styled inflation–unemployment dynamics that are a hybrid of Keynesian and NAIRU dynamics. Conflict inflation arises when economic activity rises above the consistent claims activity level, and it is subject to self-propelled conflict accelerationism. Immediately below that level, inflation holds constant at the expected rate. At low activity, accelerating disinflation can develop. That produces a family of pseudo-Phillips curves, each indexed by the expected inflation rate. The middle portion of the pseudo-Phillips curve is horizontal and stable. The outer portions are unstable, being marked by accelerating inflation and accelerating deflation. Conflict inflation is best addressed by unconventional policies, such as incomes policy.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.