REVIEW OF CORPORATE LITIGATION: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Fangjun Sang et al.
What the paper says
This paper reviews research on corporate litigation with a focus on securities litigation, as it has been the most common type of corporate litigation in recent years. The legal and economics literature explain why settlements are more likely to take place in corporate lawsuits by analyzing the role of economic incentives, information asymmetry, agency cost, and transaction cost in the litigation process and settlement decisions. A large body of empirical research in multiple disciplines (law, economics, management, finance, and accounting, etc.) document evidence consistent with the theoretical explanations.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00 |
| M · momentum | 0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.