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Why Does Disability Insurance Enrollment Increase During Recessions? Evidence from Medicare

Colleen Carey et al.

The Review of Economics and Statistics2026https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.a.1698article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) awards rise in recessions, especially for workers over age 50. We use Medicare data to investigate how health, entry costs, and age-based DI eligibility rules shape this pattern. Entrants induced by recessions have lower medical spending and mortality than typical recipients. Entry responses to unemployment jump two- to fourfold at ages 50 and 55, when eligibility rules relax. Using these age-based discontinuities as instruments, we find no shift in marginal entrants' health across unemployment levels. These findings show that DI's age-based eligibility rules are a primary driver of cyclical entry, while health shocks are not.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.a.1698

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@article{colleen2026,
  title        = {{Why Does Disability Insurance Enrollment Increase During Recessions? Evidence from Medicare}},
  author       = {Colleen Carey et al.},
  journal      = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.a.1698},
}

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Why Does Disability Insurance Enrollment Increase During Recessions? Evidence from Medicare

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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