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Major Power Rivalry and Wedge Strategy of Concessions

Hankyeul Yang

Journal of Conflict Resolution2026https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261417327article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

Military alliances are an important feature of major power competition. One way for a major power to increase its relative power is to drive a wedge in a rival’s alliance. Why and when does a major power do so? I propose a theory of strategic opportunity, which holds that a major power seeks to drive a wedge in the rival’s alliance by offering economic aid to a rival’s protégé when that country experiences a rapid deterioration in its relations with its patron. I test my theory on major power rivalry dyads and find empirical support for my argument on a set of directed dyad-year observations between 1960 and 2010. The findings contribute to our understanding of alliance politics and strategic considerations behind using economic carrots in major power rivalry.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261417327

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@article{hankyeul2026,
  title        = {{Major Power Rivalry and Wedge Strategy of Concessions}},
  author       = {Hankyeul Yang},
  journal      = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027261417327},
}

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Major Power Rivalry and Wedge Strategy of Concessions

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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